Seventeenth-century courts expanded the scope of the law even further. Into the 1660s, courts had held that a work was libelous only if it was spread intentionally with a full knowledge of its contents.
6 This left a loophole for printers and sellers, as they repeatedly claimed to be unaware of the libelous content of the works they handled. Roger L'Estrange, head of Charles II's licensure office, expressed his disbelief in such ignorance, declaring that these claims were "but a shift, for ye great part," and he argued that the mere possession of a libelous work should be sufficient for conviction.
7 By the end of the century, courts were moving in the direction of L'Estrange's proposal. In Rex v. Bear (1698), Lord Chief Justice Holt made it clear that intent no longer mattered, declaring that the mere act of copying a libel was "highly criminal."
8 The conviction of bookseller George Strahan in 1717 showed that the courts had adopted L'Estrange's view, for the judge had reasoned that "if a Libellous Paper be found in a Man's Custody, as upon a Shelf in one's House or Shop . . . it shall be thought he printed it, unless he can give a good Account how he came by it, to excuse himself." Judicial rulings also began to make conviction easier. Juries were not allowed to decide if a work was libelous, for judges simply told them that the prosecution of a publication proved that it was seditious. As Philip Hamburger points out in his comprehensive study of seditious libel, "When a judge declared that no honest man could dispute his opinion [that a work was seditious] and that he hoped the jury was well affected to the government, few members of the panel would be so courageous as to dissent."
10
This effectively meant that prosecution of a publication was sufficient proof that it was criminal, and the only thing left for the jury to decide was whether the evidence showed that the accused had written, printed, or published the work.
Yet the master-servant relationship could blur the line of responsibility under the law. In a seditious libel case from 1663 the defense had argued that since a servant, not the master, had picked up the page proofs, seditious libel against the master could not be proven. The implication was that the servant had acted without the knowledge or direction of the master, but Chief Justice Hyde instructed the jury to dismiss this defense, scoffing at the idea that a master would not know what went on in his own shop.
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Hyde's ruling was based on the current ideology of the relationship between the master and servant. This presumed that an enforceable contract existed between them that gave the master full control over the servant's time and labor. 12 As an eighteenth-century sermon reminded servants, "your time and strength are no longer your own, when you are hired; they are your master's and to be employed in his service." 13 Another pamphlet from the 1740s declared that "a servant is supposed to have no will of his own, where his master is concerned." 14 Many contemporary works on the servant-master relationship did qualify these exhortations to obedience by declaring that a servant was bound to obey only lawful or moral orders. 15 However, determining what was a legal order in the printing and publishing trades was difficult since the decision to charge a work with seditious libel occurred only after the work was printed and sold; servants would find out that their masters' orders were illegal only after the fact.
This emphasis on obedience also presumed that servants were just following orders, and those servants arrested for their role in printing or distributing libels often used this as their defense in court. For example, in August 1721 Henry Morely, a journeyman employed by printer William Wilkins, was taken into custody regarding a libel in the London Journal for 12 August 1721. Morely admitted that he was the pressman who printed the paper but he explained that "he did it by the order of his said master Mr. Wilkins."
16 His fellow pressmen Abraham Lickhordy and James Street gave similar testimony.
17 Mary Zierenburg and her servant Susan Norman, who also were taken into custody for distributing this newspaper, testified that Norman had been "sent by her mistress" for this particular paper which she received from "Mr. Peele's servant." She added that this was her regular duty, and she often picked up papers "from Mr. Peele & also his family servants."
18
As this case suggests, those printing and selling newspapers were particularly vulnerable to prosecution for seditious libel. Once printed, newspapers were sent to an established network of mercuries (newspaper distributors) and other newspaper sellers who had standing orders for them. They had no advance knowledge of the contents, and even the printers might not be fully aware of what they had printed, due to the pace of production which was timed to coincide with the departure of the mail coaches on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays that delivered the newspapers throughout the countryside.
19 Servants and masters certainly did not read every edition of every daily, biweekly, and weekly paper they handled; they simply carried on their regular trade, only to be caught up when the government decided to prosecute, since under the law anyone who distributed a paper was considered a "publisher" and thus was liable to be charged over its contents.
Given these conditions, it might seem surprising that individuals continued to print and publish materials that were critical of the government. Yet for many, the potential profit outweighed the risk. There was a large and growing demand for newspapers and serial publications: between 1700 and 1715, more than 350 different newspapers and serials were published. Daniel Defoe estimated in 1710 that 200,000 copies of newspapers were published each week, although the number probably was closer to a government estimate of 43,800 per week; however, many copies had more than one reader.
20 Government officials and their allies repeatedly lamented that those publications that criticized the government proved to be most popular. Jonathan Swift reported that when Queen Anne sent a message in 1712 to the House of Commons asking them to consider a stamp tax on newspapers, she emphasized "the great licenses taken in publishing false and scandalous libels, such as are a reproach to any government; and recommending to them to find a remedy equal to the mischief." Swift explained that she was referring to "these weekly and daily papers and pamphlets, reflecting upon the persons and the management of the ministry" which he called "this universal mischief."
21
The stamp tax did little to hinder the opposition press, and in 1718, a government official noted that "it is scarce credible what numbers of these papers are distributed both in Town and Country were [sic] they do more mischief than any other Libel being wrote ad Captum of the common people."
22 He was referring to the Weekly Journal, published by Nathaniel Mist, a Tory printer with ties to Jacobites abroad. This was one of the most popular papers in the 1720s, with as many as 10,000 copies printed each week. 23 In the 1730s, following the decline of the Weekly Journal, another opposition paper, the Country Journal; or, The Craftsman¸ took its place, with one contemporary flatly stating that there was "no Paper selling better than the Country Journal."
24 While contemporaries speculated that these papers were highly profitable, bringing their proprietors more than £1,000 per year, any paper with such extensive circulation also promised profits for those who printed and sold it. This included the mercuries as well as book and pamphlet sellers and street hawkers.
Although the public demand for opposition newspapers like Mist's Weekly Journal made selling them profitable, they also carried risks, and for some, arrest itself could be a heavy punishment. Although seditious libel was a misdemeanor, it could lead to fines and imprisonment, both before and after conviction. Those who were arrested might be required to post bonds to be released pending trial, or they might be required to find individuals who would post sureties to guarantee their good behavior; failure to secure these financial guarantees meant remaining in custody until the trial or until the government decided to drop the charges. 25 The impact of such imprisonment is reflected in a petition from printer Andrew Hynde, imprisoned for seditious libel in 1718. Writing in the third person, Hynde describes himself as a prisoner in the Fleet, to the great detriment of himself, as well as of a young child and a wife who has not long to [reckon?] and now keeps her bed in a languishing condition of a violent fever. That extreme poverty hath heretofore compell'd him to be under your honors Displeasure but whenever he comes out of his confinement he solemnly promises let his necessities be ever so great, not to offend in the like nature again.
26
Hynde's statement that his extreme poverty led him to publish the offending pamphlet is further evidence that individuals ran the risk of arrest because opposition pieces were likely to make money. But his promise not to offend again is also an example of how the government could use the law of seditious libel as a threat and punishment, even without bringing the case to court. 27 For those who were convicted, the range of punishments included fines, imprisonment, and even the pillory.
28
Any of these punishments could spell disaster, which made the question of whether a master was responsible for the actions of a servant even more significant, and in the 1720s, several trials took place that raised questions about the justice of holding masters criminally liable for actions servants took without their knowledge or direction. In early 1724, the Whitehall Evening Post was investigated for an alleged libel.
29 Pamphlet seller and mercury Ann Dodd was immediately targeted, for not only had her shop sold a copy of the offending issue to investigating officers, but the paper listed her as the person to whom advertisements should be sent for inclusion in the paper. Dodd was one of the most well-known mercuries of her day, and since opening her shop in 1711 at the Peacock just outside Temple Bar, she had been known for distributing opposition papers. In 1718, Dodd's husband, journeyman printer Nathaniel Dodd, asserted that the shop took in about 1,700 copies of Mist's Weekly Journal every week, most of which were then distributed to other sellers.
30 At the time of her arrest in 1724, she was a widow with four young children, and a set of dedicated servants.
31
When these servants were brought in for questioning, they uniformly denied that she had any knowledge of the article that brought about the seditious libel charge; in fact, they testified that she was unaware that this particular issue of the paper had been sold at her shop. William Hewitt testified that Dodd was "very ill & confined to her bed & not having been in the shop or concerned her self with any business in the shop for some time . . . ." He added that he was the one who had accepted the paragraph for publication and that "of his own accord & without the knowledge, consent or privity of his said mistress [he did] carry the said paper writing" to the printer for inclusion in the newspaper.
32 Two more of Dodd's servants, Mary Dewe and Sarah Jeeves, reported that the physician who examined Dodd a week prior to the publication of the alleged libel found her "very dangerously ill [and] advised that she should not be troubled with or talked to [about] any business whatsoever but be kept very quiet." The two women testified that at least one of them had been in constant attendance on Dodd throughout her illness, and both testified that no one had mentioned the paragraph in question-or any other business-in their presence. They asserted that Dodd gave no orders about the paragraph and had no knowledge of it prior to its publication. Their interrogation took place a week after the newspaper was published, and they testified that Dodd still knew nothing about it because they believed that "they cannot acquaint her with any thing relating to the said paragraph or what has been done thereon without indangering her life."
33 Yet despite the testimony of her servants, when Dodd's case came to trial later that year, the court held that "the Master shall be chargeable with his Servant's publishing a Libel in his Absence" and she was found guilty of the libel.
34
This conviction did little to stop Dodd's activities, and in the 1720s and 1730s, she and fellow mercury Elizabeth Nutt were among the most wellknown pamphlet sellers in London, with their names appearing jointly as the sellers of newspapers, pamphlets, plays, poems, and similar publications. Elizabeth Carr had married printer John Nutt in 1692, and together they had at least thirteen children between 1693 and 1711. After John's death in 1716, she ran the lucrative printing business he had established, which included a monopoly on printing all books related to the English Common Law.
35 Yet she was not simply a widow who took over her husband's business following his death: despite her frequent pregnancies, she had carried on her own business as a mercury for years, with John Dunton referring to her in 1705 as one of the "honest (Mercurial) women." 36 In the late 1720s, Nutt herself declared that "it has been her business for about forty years to sell News papers and pamphlets at the Royal Exchange."
37
Her shop was located at the south entrance to the Royal Exchange, a prime location where she sold "a large number of publications relating to trade and commerce."
38 But Nutt also sold opposition newspapers, and in 1728 she was arrested for selling an issue of Mist's Weekly Journal that seemed to question the legitimacy of the king.
39 This case raised the same issues regarding servant/master relations and the law of libel as had that of Ann Dodd four years earlier, but Nutt's case had a far different outcome.
40
The offending essay appeared in the 24 August 1728 issue of Mist's Weekly Journal, a leading Tory paper whose popularity was due in part to the lively introductory essay in each issue. In this case, it took the form of a letter written by "Amos Dudge" whose description of political conditions in Persia was a thinly veiled statement on English politics.
41
In Dudge's account, "Merewits" (George I) had usurped the throne, which was now occupied by his son, the "Tyrant Esreff" (George II), keeping "prince Sophi" (the Pretender, James Francis Edward Stuart) from his rightful place. According to Dudge not only had Merewits illegally seized the throne, but Esreff was a bastard, a fact concealed from the public.
42
Dudge then described the rightful Persian ruler, Sophi, as a man who "has no seraglio, but has taken to his Arms one Princess, whose Royal Virtues are fit to warm the Breast where dwells so great a Heart." The Pretender's supposed faithfulness to his wife was thus a contrast to the behavior of George II, whose mistresses were prominent at court. 43 The article concluded that Esreff "[maintains] Possession of the Empire, in Opposition to a lawful Sophi, whose undoubted Right is supported by the Affection and Duty of the Generality of the People, by whom hourly Prayers are offered up for his Restoration."
44
This letter provoked an immediate reaction from the government, since by implying that the Pretender had a right to the crown, it appeared to violate the treason statute of 6 Anne, c. 41 (1707). 45 Government officials began a sweeping campaign to arrest those connected with the paper. George II personally approved the action after his ministers took the highly unusual step of directly consulting him about it.
46 Mist had left the country months earlier, but nearly two dozen people, including his three journeymen, two apprentices, two devils (menial print shop servants), and his housekeeper were taken into custody.
47 Ultimately, the government charged Nutt and two of Mist's servants with seditious libel; they avoided a charge of treason only because the attorney general decided that he could not prove that the defendants acted with "express malice."
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The three trials took place in the Court of King's Bench on the same day in January 1729 before the same judges and jury, and they highlighted the difficulties presented in the master/servant relationship. Both of Mist's servants argued that they bore no responsibility for the libel because they were servants carrying out their normal duties. The attorney for John Clarke, one of Mist's journeyman printers, argued that his client had "acted merely as a Servant to the Printer" by working the press. He added that the prosecutor offered no evidence that Clarke knew the content of the paper. 49 The attorney for Mist's compositor Robert Knell made a similar argument, pointing out that because he had jointly composed the Dudge letter with the other compositor, he never read the entire article and was ignorant of its full content. Yet their intent was immaterial since the jury was asked to decide only whether they had helped to print or publish it. In this case, their status as servants and their ignorance of the content was not deemed to be an excuse; the mere fact that they participated in the composing and printing the paper was sufficient to find them guilty.
50
But ignorance was a very different issue in Elizabeth Nutt's case. As was the case with Ann Dodd in 1724, Nutt's defense was that when the paper was brought into her shop, she was bedridden at her home in the Savoy, more than a mile away from her shop at the Royal Exchange. In fact, her attorney claimed that she had been bedridden for some time and could therefore have known nothing about the paper. He pointed out the injustice of holding Nutt criminally responsible for a servant's actions taken in her absence and without her knowledge. The judge countered this argument by stating that "the Master of the Shop is answerable for whatever Books are sold there."
51 Yet even though only five years earlier Ann Dodd had been convicted in similar circumstances, the jury in this case refused to accept the judge's opinions. Instead, it stated its belief that Elizabeth Nutt was guilty of nothing except keeping a shop that sold pamphlets and newspapers and that "it is not such a criminal Fact as is charged in the Indictment."
52 As the jury refused to enter a proper judgment against Nutt for seditious libel, the prosecution allowed the case to drop.
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Did Elizabeth Nutt's gender play a role in the jury's decision? While accounts of the trial state contain the vague and ambiguous statement that "the Jury thought it a hard case," we cannot interpret this as an expression of sympathy for Nutt due to her gender. During her trial, her attorney focused solely on the question of whether Nutt knew or authorized the sale of Mist's Weekly Journal. To be sure, Nutt did mention gender when she petitioned to be released from custody following her arrest, describing herself as "an Antient Woman near seventy years of age, [who] has a large family and many children unprovided for." She asked that the prosecution against her be dropped because it must "inevitably end in the utter Ruin of herself and Numerous Family."
54 But petitions that pleaded for lenience on the basis of age or family situation were not limited to women, and those from women did not always cite their families as a reason for compassion. Andrew Hynde's petition cited above mentions his ailing wife and destitute child. In 1720, printer Francis Clifton pleaded for assistance from Charles Delafaye, under secretary of state, citing his family's "distressed state."
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Ann Dodd petitioned the Duke of Newcastle to quash the warrant for her arrest for selling the 24 August 1728 edition of Mist's Weekly Journal, but she cited only her own ill health as a reason for clemency. Three years later, she changed tactics and asked for clemency on a charge of seditious libel by pointing out that she was "left an afflicted widow with a Large young Family"; since her husband had died in 1723, her bereavement was not of recent date, and her four children ranged in age from nine to twenty-three. 56 In 1735, Mary Barber asked that the libel case against her be dropped because it kept her "from attending the business of her family."
57
Yet whatever reasons led the jury to this verdict, its show of independence in Nutt's case went against decades of court precedent, and it occurred during a period of increasing debate about the law of libel and freedom of the press. 58 The Country Journal; or, The Craftsman was particularly vocal about the use of the libel law to silence critics of the government. In a lengthy essay published on 9 March 1728, the Craftsman's editor denounced his "little, scribbling Adversaries" for arguing over the past year that criticism of ministers was tantamount to an attack on the king.
59 He enlarged this attack in June by contrasting the political views of Whigs and Tories, especially when it came to freedom of the press, noting with irony that " There were several high-profile libel cases against newspapers in the 1730s that were extensively discussed in the press. For example, Elizabeth Nutt, Ann Dodd, and printer Richard Francklin were among those arrested in January 1731 for an alleged libel published in the Craftsman. 64 Francklin's arrest, trial, and conviction were reported in various newspapers as well as in a pamphlet published in London, Edinburgh, and Dublin that gave a detailed account of the trial.
65 This was part of a minor pamphlet war that was clearly fought along political lines over the freedom of the press and the law of libel, centering on the Craftsman. 66 Only a few years later, several pamphlets were published on the trial of colonial printer John Peter Zenger, who was acquitted on charges of seditious libel. 67 Zenger founded the New York Weekly Journal in 1733, and it quickly ran afoul of local authorities for criticizing the royal governor and his administration. Zenger's defense was that his statements were true and therefore were not libelous; he also argued that it was the jury, not the prosecutor, who had the right to decide if a publication was criminal. 68 Zenger's defense attorney, like the editor of the Craftsman in London, placed his case within the larger context of the rights of Englishmen and freedom of the press. A London publisher capitalized on this emphasis in 1738 by advertising the fourth edition of the account of Zenger's trial as "the completest Piece on the Doctrine of Libels yet publish'd." 69 All of this served to keep the issue of seditious libel before the public and brought larger issues about the English legal system under scrutiny. In 1731, one author pointed out that the harassment and imprisonment of printers and publishers would limit press freedom and asked whether a person acquitted by a "fair English Jury" should face rearrest "as often as the Spleen or Power of his Enemies shall think proper?" If such a situation prevailed, he concluded, "farewell the Liberty of Englishmen; farewell Magna Charta." 70 An enterprising publisher in 1732 reprinted The Englishman's Right: A Dialogue between a Barrister at Law and a Juryman, a pamphlet originally published in 1680 by Sir John Hawles, who argued that the right of an independent jury to render a just verdict was the only safeguard against government tyranny.
71 When juries accepted without question a judge's assertion that a crime had been committed, this endangered the entire jury system and ultimately the rights of all Englishmen. Hawles argued that the jury was obligated to weigh all matters of fact in order to apply the law. This included evaluating the evidence and considering the intent of the accused before deciding whether or not a crime had been committed.
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This argument also had implications for seditious libel and the masterservant relationship, for if a servant acted without the master's knowledge, the master could not be said to have had libelous intent. This may explain why Elizabeth Nutt's case became a precedent for those arguing that the libel laws needed reform. While the cases of Francklin and Zenger attracted far more attention in their day, it was a London jury's refusal to convict Nutt that made her case important for later reformers. Since Francklin had been convicted, like so many others accused of seditious libel, his case provided few grounds for questioning the law of libel. Even though Zenger had been acquitted by a jury that considered his intent, English legal scholars may have questioned the legitimacy of using a colonial case as a precedent in an English court.
73 But Nutt had not been convicted, and her English jury did consider her intent: while she was the owner of the pamphlet shop, her servant made the sale without her knowledge, which meant that there could have been no specific intent on Nutt's part to distribute the alleged libel. These features of Nutt's case attracted the attention of those who questioned the government's manipulation of juries in cases of libel, and it was readily accessible for use as a precedent, having been included in John D. Fitzgibbon 74 In 1765, attorney and author John Rayner included a summary of the case in his study of seditious libel, largely repeating Barnardiston's account. 75 Rayner's work was one of a number of books and pamphlets written in the 1760s on libel laws and published in the wake of the government's prosecution of John Wilkes for a seditious libel in the North Briton no. 45.
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One of the leading radical publishers who addressed (and was subject to) the law of seditious libel was John Almon, who had the backing of leading opposition figures, including Wilkes. They paid the expenses of publishing his political pamphlets and books, so that unlike Dodd, Nutt, and others earlier in the century, Almon's publishing reflected the political interests of his patrons. If he faced arrest for these works, his patrons supplied financial and political support for his defense. 77 Almon published a number of works on libel in the 1760s, including the first published account of the case of William Owen, tried for seditious libel in 1752 for selling a pamphlet critical of the House of Commons. The prosecution's argument in that case, made by Solicitor General William Murray (later Lord Mansfield, the Chief Justice) declared that if the jury concluded that the evidence showed that Owen sold the pamphlet, they were to find him guilty; the question of whether or not the pamphlet was seditious was a matter of law, not fact, which meant that the judges, not the jury, decided if selling the pamphlet was evidence of criminal intent. Murray referred to recent debates in the press about the jury's right to decide both the fact and the law, and emphasized to the jury that its duty was to "judge of the FACTS we have laid before you, now in court, and ONLY them" [italics in original].
78 In turn, Mr. Ford, Owen's attorney, argued that the question of seditious intent was an issue of fact, not law. Since the charge against Owen was that he had "published this pamphlet, maliciously, seditiously, scandalously, and falsely, to the calumny of the House of Commons of Great-Britain," Ford argued that only proving the sale of the book, does not prove all those opprobrious and hard terms laid in the charge against him. If his selling and publishing this book maliciously, with a seditious intent, scandalously and falsely, with a design to calumniate the House of Commons, and in order to disturb the peace of the nation, is not proved, then this great charge in the information fails. Let the gentlemen [i.e. the prosecution] prove those words (the intention) if they mean anything by them; if they do not prove these terms, this bad intent, for in that lies the crime, then it is no more than selling printed paper, in which surely there can be no fault.
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Ford went on to point out to the jury that if they believed Owen had no criminal intent in his actions, they had to declare him not guilty; even if they rendered a special verdict, i.e., guilty of publishing but with no criminal intent, they still left him open to punishment under the guilty verdict. After several hours' deliberation, the jury acquitted Owen.
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Almon himself was tried for seditious libel in 1770. In a situation very similar to that of Elizabeth Nutt over forty years earlier, Almon had been absent from his shop when his servant sold to a government agent a copy of the London Museum that reprinted a letter by Junius which the government alleged was a criminal attack on the monarchy. Although the magazine advertised that it could be purchased at Almon's shop, the defense argued that Almon had no intent to commit seditious libel since he had no control over its content, was not in the shop at the time it was delivered, and had not given his servant any direct instructions to sell it. He claimed that when he returned to his shop, he gave orders to stop selling it and send it back to the printer because he had heard that the government was taking action against it.
81 Justice Mansfield was unconvinced, and his summation to the jury was similar to that made in Elizabeth Nutt's case: "a sale at man's shop-and a sale therein by his servant, is evidence . . . to convict the master of publication; because whatever any man does by another, he does it himself." 82 But jury was not fully convinced, for after about two hours' deliberation it asked the court "whether selling in the shop by a servant, of a pamphlet, without the knowledge, privity, or concurrence of the master in the sale, or even without a knowledge of the contents of the libel or pamphlet so sold, be sufficient evidence to convict the master?" Lord Mansfield replied somewhat equivocally, suggesting that if it could be proven that the sale was "by trick or collusion, and without [Almon's] knowledge or privity," any judgment against Almon in this case could be set aside. 83 The jury thereupon returned a guilty verdict, leading Almon to petition for a new trial in June 1770.
In the hearing on the petition, the defense focused on the fact that the jury in Almon's case had asked for clarification about the legal relationship between the master and servant. Almon's counsel argued that the jury should have been allowed to consider intent and whether the master had known about or given instructions regarding the seditious work. Unless juries could consider these questions, any bookseller who left employees to run the shop in their absence would be "at the mercy of their servants," whose actions could lead to the master's criminal prosecution for libel. 84 Thus, the law might hold the master guilty, yet justice might demand that the master be found innocent.
This was the context in which Elizabeth Nutt's trial was discussed. Almon's counsel John Glynn pointed out that it was not the jury but the judge who declared that Nutt's "intent" was shown by the fact that anything sold in her shop was for her benefit. 85 But the jury had ignored this interpretation of the law and refused to convict her. Glynn argued that the jury in Almon's case had misunderstood the judge's response about masters being liable for the actions of servants, and for that reason Almon deserved a new trial. 86 The justices disagreed, pointing out that Almon's case differed from that of Nutt because Almon was listed on the publication line of the paper as its chief seller. They concluded that this proved intent, even if Almon had given no specific instructions about the offending issue, and they denied his request for a new trial.
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John Glynn subsequently defended several others who had been arrested at the same time as Almon for publishing Junius's letter, including Henry Woodfall, who had originally published the letter in the Public Advertiser of 19 December 1769, and John Miller, who reprinted it in the London Evening Post on the same date. Woodfall and Miller would be brought to trial after Almon, even though they had been the initial publishers of it; the author of the published account of Almon's trial suggested that this was done to punish Almon for his activities in opposing the government.
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But unlike Almon, neither man was convicted; Woodfall's jury returned a special verdict of "guilty of printing and publishing only," and Miller's jury acquitted him. 89 Almon's case was one of more than a dozen prosecutions for seditious libel in 1760s and 1770s which had heightened public debate and led to calls for a legislative remedy. 90 John Glynn took the arguments made in the trials of Almon, Woodfall, and Miller to Parliament, having been elected an MP for Middlesex in 1768. In a speech proposing that a committee be formed to examine the administration of criminal justice and freedom of the press, he argued that judges should not be instructing juries that masters were responsible for servants' actions in criminal cases nor that the sale of a book from a bookseller's shop was proof of his explicit knowledge and intent. Glynn discussed Nutt's case at some length as an example of the "iniquity" of such a situation, arguing that this undermined the jury system and limited the freedom of the press by denying the jury's right to consider whether or not the case amounted to a libel.
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This was part of an unsuccessful effort to pass a Parliamentary bill drawn up by Edmund Burke in 1771 that attempted to clarify the "doubts and controversies . . . concerning the right of jurors to try the whole matter" in libel cases; the bill declared that "in law and in right, [the jury was] competent to try every part of the matter laid or charged" in the indictment, which included determining whether the work in question was libelous, and if the person accused had intended to print or disseminate a criminal publication.
92 While this bill was ultimately defeated, the question of the jury's right to consider "the whole matter" continued to be raised by further trials in in the 1770s and 1780s. Intent and context were the issues in the trial of John Horne for publishing a notice in June 1775 announcing that a meeting of the Constitutional Society had voted to open a subscription for the widows and orphans of Americans who were "inhumanly murdered" by royal troops at the battles of Lexington and Concord. Horne admitted that he had published the paragraph, but argued that it had to be placed by the jury into its appropriate context: he wrote it when the country was "in a time of profound peace" and no prosecution had taken place until a civil war had broken out. He warned that this opened the door to prosecutions of any work published decades earlier; when these were taken out of their original context, a very different intent could be ascribed to the author. 93 Horne's well-publicized trial and the efforts to overturn his guilty verdict kept before the public the issue of the jury's right to decide the intent of the accused.
94 This was a key element in another highly publicized libel trial, that of William Davies Shipley, the Dean of St. Asaph's, in 1784. At issue was a pamphlet on the electoral system that was in the form of a dialogue between a scholar and a farmer. 95 Written by Sir William Jones, this short pamphlet argued in favor of giving every man a voice in political society. The prosecution was lodged against Shipley, rather than the pamphlet's author, because of his alleged intent to distribute it at low cost "to the Multitude." 96 According to the prosecution, making the pamphlet widely available to the poor increased the likelihood that it would lead to a breach of the peace, which was the essence of seditious libel. Shipley's defense, led by the notable barrister Thomas Erskine, argued that the pamphlet was published with the intention of supporting rather than undermining the Constitution, and that the jury had a right to consider Shipley's intent as part of their verdict.
97 Apparently the jury agreed, for they returned a verdict of "Guilty of Publishing, but whether a Libel or Not the Jury do not Find."
98 This partial verdict led to a call for a new trial, with Erskine arguing that juries could and should be allowed to consider the law as well as the relevant facts, saying that "no act which the law in its general theory holds to be criminal, constitutes in itself a crime abstracted from the mischievous intention of the actor."
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By the 1790s, it was clear that even judicial opinion was changing about libel cases. Edward Topham, publisher of the World newspaper, had been convicted in 1790 for a publishing a libel on the recently-deceased Earl Cowper, but his attorneys appealed the judgment on the grounds that the jury should have been allowed to consider whether Topham intended to undermine Cowper's reputation or if the article was simply a biographical piece occasioned by the earl's death. Significantly, the appeal court justices accepted the case against Elizabeth Nutt as evidence "of a publication in point of law, where no criminal intention can be imputed to the party."
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Similarly, the justices also cited Horne's case as a precedent that justified allowing the jury to consider intent.
101 Given the nature of this summary of precedent, it is not surprising that the court overturned Topham's conviction.
This increased emphasis on intent, coupled with the changing view of the master/servant relationship, made it less likely that an employer would be held accountable for actions taken by a servant in the master's absence. Contemporaries had envisioned the master and servant relationship as one of the "three great relations in private life," as the famous jurist Sir William Blackstone described it, the other two being a husband and wife and parents and children. 102 In this view, the actions of children, wives, and servants were the responsibility of the master of the house and an extension of his will and interests. But even as Blackstone wrote in the 1760s, the nature of work and employment was changing as the capitalist economy of Britain evolved.
Concerns about the nation's prosperity, as well as the growing importance of capital, led eighteenth-century observers to examine those elements which contributed to the economic health of the nation. In 1720, the Scottish economist John Law argued that the economy was no longer based on land, as it had been in previous eras, but now turned on the production of goods, which was dependent upon having sufficient money to hire the requisite labor. Law went on to declare that "Domestick Trade depends on the Money: A greater Quantity employs more People than a lesser Quantity. A limited Sum can only set a number of People to work proportion'd to it, and 'tis with little Success Laws are made, for employing the Poor or Idle in Countries where Money is scarce."
103 Clearly Law saw labor as a form of commodity that could be hired with enough money; he made no distinctions, however, between different types of labor and their relative value.
But by mid-century, economists were taking a closer look at this aspect. One of these was Joseph Harris, an assistant assay master at the Royal Mint. In An Essay upon Money and Coins, Part 1: The Theories of Commerce, Money and Exchanges (1757), he argued that labor was a greater source of British wealth than land, and that different types of labor had different value. He went on to explain that "things in general are valued, not according to their real uses in supplying the necessities of men; but rather in proportion to the land, labour and skill that are requisite to produce them." He flatly declared that the price of labor was "the chief standard that regulates the value of all things" [italics in original]. 104 He then went on to explain that the distinctive training, skills, and knowledge of individual trades were part of the formula that determined wages:
To bring up a child to a trade, there is not only an expence in fitting him out, and during his apprenticeship, but also a risqué [sic] of his dying before he is out of his time; from which considerations a mechanic is entitled to better wages than a common labourer: And as any given trade is attended with greater risques of any sort, requires more skill, more trust, more expence in setting up, &c. the artificer will be entitled to still better wages. In like manner, those professions that require genius, great confidence, a liberal education, &c. have a right to be rewarded proportionably. And thus, the prices of labour and services of different sorts, have a considerable difference founded in the nature between them.
Only two years later, London merchant Philip Cantillon made a similar argument in The Analysis of Trade, Commerce, Coin, Bullion, Banks, and Foreign Exchanges. Cantillon argued that those trades that took money, time, and talent or which entailed great personal risk "ought to earn more than other Labourers."
105 He concluded that it was "the Value of the Labour made Use of, to produce all Goods and Merchandize, which fixes their intrinsic Value or Worth."
106
These approaches show that the work done by servants was coming to be viewed as a commodity that could be bought and sold, rather than a personal relationship. 107 This was a point emphasized in Adam Smith's An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). He distinguished between productive and unproductive labor, describing the former as an action that produced a "vendible commodity, which lasts for some time at least after that labour is past" while the latter encompassed all those "services [which] generally perish in the very instance of their performance, and seldom leave any trace or value behind them, for which an equal quantity of service could afterwards be procured." 108 Smith went on to argue that a servant engaged in productive work left the economy with a surplus, while the unproductive servant left it with a deficit. Thus unproductive servants were a luxury that could hurt the economy.
109
Accordingly, some politicians came to the conclusion that such servants could be taxed. This type of thinking was behind the 1777 tax on menservants (17 Geo. III, c. 39), an act that specified that household servants would be taxed at a rate of 21 shillings per annum, but exempted those employed "for the Purposes of Husbandry or Manufacture, or of any Trade or calling by which the Master or Mistress of such Servant earn a Livelihood or Profit . . . ."
110 As Caroline Steedman points out, "In contradiction to a general schema in which what was contracted for was a servant's time and energies, leased to another for a period, post-1777 tax law (as interpreted by the common law courts) named a worker's skills and capacities, what he or she actually did in the labour of service, as defining characteristics."
111
Pamphlets and sermons reflected this changing perception, for while most continued to urge servants to be obedient and submissive, some authors were now portraying the relationship between master and servant as more mechanistic and less personal. One sermon argued that the "sloth and negligence of servants" was a threat to good order; performing their duty "is a point of the utmost consequence . . . because, in this large and complicated machine of the universe, if the smaller, or subordinate wheels, are out of order, it must, of course, retard the motion, and interrupt the operations of the whole."
112 Another author urged masters to recognize that their servants were part of a system that benefitted both: 114 Another described the situation of "mercenary servants" who were "only bound by a contract of letting and hiring." Their masters had "no other power over them, than to appoint the work to them for which they bind themselves . . . . He has no right to exact any other work or service from them, but that for which they bind themselves."
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According to historian Susan Brown, these new discussions about the nature of a servant's labor led to "a popular redefinition of work and productivity"
116 which in turn altered the master/servant relationship. The presumption that everything the servant did was an extension of the master's will and intent was being undermined as the labor relationship became an exchange of money for specific kinds of labor; in short, the shop servant was becoming an employee. The view of servants as independent actors separate and apart from their masters was also encouraged by the increasing assertiveness of servants relative to the conditions of their employment. Their demands for better pay and working conditions led Parliament to enact a series of laws throughout the century banning worker organizing in specific trades, culminating in the 1799 act outlawing all worker "combinations."
117
This ban on organizing not only emphasized the servant's individual agency and freedom of action, it also served as a reminder that the masters could be at the mercy of their servants. When this was combined with the new theoretical models of work proposed by Smith and others, it challenged the image of the obedient servant who did the master's bidding, and it made it untenable to hold the master criminally responsible for the servant's actions.
This was the crux of the argument made in the seditious libel cases of Ann Dodd, Elizabeth Nutt, John Almon, and others. Their attorneys had argued that the master could not be held liable for the actions of servants if those actions were taken without the master's knowledge and consent; the master could not have had criminal intent if he or she was unaware of the contents of what was sold in the shop, or even that the offending publication had been sold. The issue of intent had been at the crux of the debate on the rights of juries in subsequent seditious libel trials, even those that did not include the vexed question of servant/master responsibility. This would ultimately lay the basis for the Juries Act (usually known as Fox's Libel Act) of 1792 that legalized the power of juries to consider intent in libel cases.
The bill "To Remove Doubt Respecting the Functions of Juries in Cases of Libel" was introduced by the leader of the Parliamentary opposition, Charles James Fox, in May 1791. Debate on this bill specifically recalled earlier cases, including Almon's trial and conviction for publication of Junius's letter.
118 Fox's argument focused on the jury's right to consider the intent of the author or publisher as a part of their deliberations.
119 When judges denied the jury's right to decide whether or not a work was libelous, they took away its ability to decide intent; as Fox argued, this suggested that the jury was incapable of deciding the meaning of the work in question.
120 In effect, the "The jury might find the publication of the words, and the judges might determine their meaning. Here then was a case where the life of a British subject was dependent, not upon a jury of his fellow subjects, judging upon the circumstances of the case, but upon four lawyers, studying, in their closets, the inferences of law."
121
While the bill easily won the assent of the Commons, it faced opposition in the Lords, who began by asking for the opinions of sitting justices about libel laws; their unanimous reply was weighted heavily in favor of judicial precedent. While the justices agreed that it was appropriate for a judge to direct the jury to return a verdict for the defendant in a case where publication was proven but the content was not criminal, they added that "no Case has occurred in which it would have been . 122 This argument proved unconvincing, and the bill passed and was enacted into law.
The first case brought to court after the passage of the Libel Act focused on intent, but it also addressed the master/servant relationship as well. John Lambert, James Perry, and James Grey-the printer, publisher, and proprietor of the Morning Chronicle-were charged with seditious libel for printing an advertisement from the Society for Political Information in Derby. This was in the form of a lengthy resolution approved by the society which noted the "deep and alarming abuses [that] exist in the British Government," which it discussed at some length. 123 While much of the trial focused on the meaning of the content, the discussion of the defendants' intent led the attorney general to argue that they should be held accountable "unless it be admitted as a doctrine, that men may carry on a trade, which is a great source of profit and emolument, entirely through the medium of servants, without being themselves in the smallest degree accountable."
124
This was an argument that would have been familiar to the earlier prosecutors of Ann Dodd, Elizabeth Nutt, John Almon, and others: because the printer, proprietors, and publishers made money from the publication, they must be responsible for what was printed in it. Yet the attorney general's statement suggested the possibility that servants could act without the specific knowledge or direction of their masters in the course of business, which in turn focused on the issue of the master's intent. As Thomas Erskine (the attorney for the defendants) pointed out, under the new Libel Act juries could acquit the defendants if they decided that the principals were not "actuated by an evil mind, and had seditious intentions." 125 He also noted that the defendants had published the offending paragraphs "in the course of their business" and that the offending paragraphs had been in the form of an advertisement which they "inserted among a thousand others, without any seditious purpose." 126 In his summation to the jury, Justice Kenyon made use of the clause in the Libel Act that allowed judges to express their own opinion, declaring that "I think this paper was published with a wicked and malicious intent to vilify the Government,"
127 but this was not enough to sway the jurymen. After five hours of deliberation, they attempted to return a special verdict of "guilty of publishing, but with no malicious intent." When the judges refused to accept it, the jury withdrew for further discussion and shortly thereafter returned a verdict of "Not Guilty."
128
The new libel law was enacted on the eve of the declaration of war against revolutionary France, and over the course of the next twenty years, the new approach was applied in seditious libel trials. But as Michael Lobban has pointed out, in the 1790s, the government's chief objective was to stamp out sedition. For that reason, trials for sedition and seditious libel shifted to-wards emphasizing the detrimental impact of words on others, regardless of what the original author had meant. 129 Yet even in this situation, it was the jury who decided the ultimate guilt or innocence of the accused as had been the intent of the Libel Act. By the 1820s it had become accepted that "the Law of Libel has in effect forbidden [jurymen] to find a verdict of guilty, on mere proof of publication, so in the absence of all positive proof of criminal intention, they are warranted by the law in finding a general verdict of not guilty." 130 Seditious libel had become a less effective weapon for the government to use to silence its detractors. Following the passage of Fox's Libel Act, it became more difficult for the government to use it to make examples of either masters or servants since juries simply were less likely to convict. In fact, the law actually could help to spread the very words the prosecutors were trying to restrict: since it allowed juries to decide the meaning of innuendoes, prosecutors now had to read and explain the content of the offending publication. In turn, this allowed newspaper reports of the trials to include verbatim transcripts of these explanations, spreading knowledge of even the most obscure pamphlet to a much wider audience.
131
Throughout the eighteenth century, cases where judges, not juries, decided that people were guilty of seditious libel when publications were sold in their names but without their knowledge encouraged the groundswell of public debate that led to the passage of the Libel Act of 1792. While this act did not specifically settle the question of a master's responsibility for a servant's actions in cases of seditious libel, the implication was clear: unless the master knew of and intended that a servant sell a seditious publication, no specific intent could be proven. This lack of intent became a key feature in libel cases later in the century, when men like John Horne and the Dean of St. Asaph's argued that they could not be found guilty of seditious libel because sedition was not what they intended. In turn, this led to a demand that juries-like that of Elizabeth Nutt-be allowed to decide whether or not a crime had been committed. As commentators at the time repeatedly noted, this was an important safeguard of the rights of Englishmen and the freedom of the press. Notes 20. James Raven notes the difficulties in estimating the readership of eighteenth-century newspapers, given the fact that a single copy in a coffeehouse or tavern might be read by a large number of individuals. 25. The government's recommendations for the nearly two dozen people who were arrested for selling Mist's Weekly Journal of 24 August 1728 provides insight into the process. Some of the individuals were ordered to be held in prison until trial, but the fate of the others varied. The wife of the newspaper's printer was discharged because "there is nothing to charge her with & turning her loose will probably be the severest punishment being very poor." Several servants and apprentices were allowed to be bailed; in some cases they had to find sureties or else be committed but in others, they were released on their own recognizances. "List of Persons arrested in Connection with Mist's Journal, and their dispositions," SP 36/8, f. 67, c. August 1728, 26. Petition for Discharge by Andrew Hynde, SP35/13, f. 96, c. November 1718. 27. The State Papers are filled with petitions asking for release sent by those taken into custody during investigations of seditious libel. One of these, from Jane Barnes in May 1723, notes that she has suffered "twenty weeks of very harsh confinement"; since she complained that she has not been allowed visitors or writing materials, it appears that she was in virtual solitary confinement. Letter from Jane Barnes to Charles Delafaye, Another contemporary pamphleteer thought that these punishments were insufficient to check those who committed seditious libel. When Richard Francklin, the printer of the Craftsman, was convicted of seditious libel in 1731, he was fined £100 and sentenced to a year in the King's Bench prison. The pamphlet's author complained that the fine was only a fraction of the annual income made by the paper, and that the printer was actually housed outside of the prison in the area known as the Liberties of the King's Bench, which meant that he could continue to print the Craftsman. 
